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FIFTY  YEARS  OF  FARM  POLICY: 
WHAT  HAVE  WE  LEARNED? 
B.  H.  Robinson· 
My  colleagues  have  provided  important  insights  into  the  level  of 
our  understanding  and  expectations  about  the  national  natural  resource 
base  and  developments  in  agricultural  trade  and  agricultural  pro-
ductivity.  These  discussions  provide  a  perspective  on  critical  com-
ponents  in  our collective  stock  of  knowledge  about  agriculture  and  its 
markets.  One  would  hope  that  this  knowledge  will  be  used  by  the 
public at  large  and  by  policy  makers  in  particular  as  they  debate  the 
issues  and  for~ulate the  1985  food  and  agriculture  legislation. 
Experience  is an  important  component  of  our  knowledge  base .  Any 
effort  to  assess  our  knowledge  of  agriculture  and  agricultural  policy 
would  be  incomplete  if  we  ignored  the  lessons  provided  by  experience. 
Few  would  argue  that  the  knowledge  gained  through  experience  wi l l 
be  excluded  from  the  debates  about  the  1985  agriculture  and  food  1egi s-
lation.  However,  one's  interpretation of  history  depends  upon  one's 
philosophical  perspective,  vested  interests,  and  sense  of  equity.  An 
important  lesson  (historical  insight)  to  some  will  seem  trivial  to 
others.  Considerable disagreement  will  emerge  as  to  the  nature  of 
historical government  involvement  in  agriculture  and  the  success 
of agricultural policy  in  achieving  various  goals.  However,  if  , 
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history  repeats  itself  one  common  theme  will  emerge:  the government 
must  remain  an  actor  in  the market  for  food  and  fiber. 
Since  it is likely  that  the  long  arm  of  government  will  continue 
to  reach  into agriculture,  it seems  appropriate  to  review  the suc-
cesses  and  failures  of  prior efforts  to  influence agricultural 
development  and  the markets  for  agricultural  products.  The  desired 
result of  such  an  effort  is that  increased  knowledge  of  consequences 
of  alternative policies will  guide  policy  makers  in selecting "new" 
policies  for  the  sector. 
Contrary  to  what  the ~itle of  this  ~iscussion  impli~s,  the  United 
States'  experience  in  tinkering with  farm  policy  has  not  been  confined 
to  the  past  50  years.  As  early as  1631,  the Virginia  Colonial 
Assembly  established a  minimum  price  for  tobacco.  By  1639,  the 
Assembly  was  required  to  enact  a  crop control  program  (quota)  in  order 
to  maintain  the  government  established price.  Policy makers  were 
provided an  early  lesson  in  one  of  the  consequences  of artificially 
high  prices:  the market  will  not absorb  increasing quantities of  a 
product  in  the absence  of  downward  price flexibility.  Other  important 
lessons  have  been  provided  through  our  history.  Yet,  the significance 
of  this single,  simple  economic  fact  continues  to  escape  some  policy 
makers. 
I  will confine most  of  my  remarks  to our  experience with agricul-
ture and  food  policies of  the past  SO  years.  This  is the period when 
we  gained most  of our  knowledge  about  the consequences of direct i 
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government  intervention  in  the agricultural  sector.  In  this period  we 
also  learned  that politicians  have  narrow  historical  perspectives. 
I  will  briefly address  some  earlier policies and outline  some 
perceptions  that may  be  helpful  in analyzing  our  most  recent  half 
century  of  experience. 
Perceptions 
Perception  I 
Access  to  a  dependable  and  productive  food  sector is critical  to 
the welfare  and  economic well-being of  any  society.  Any  time  its food 
production and distribution  system  is seriously  interrupted,  a  society 
is  threatened.  Thus,  societies and  governments  historically  have  not 
been willing  to  depend  solely  on  the market  to  produce  the desired 
results.  Rather,  the  public  has  protected its vested  interest  in 
agriculture  through  public  policies  aimed at achieving desired goals 
through  market  intervention  [12]. 
Perception II 
While  societal goals often are  reflected  through  the policies 
that are established,  we  must  recognize  that policy  is made  by  politi-
cians  and is,  therefore,  the result of  public pressures.  Pressure is 
most  often brought  to  bear  by  vested interest groups as  they  campaign 
_: ~ · : for advantage  in the market.  Thus,  one  group's desires often conflict 
. 1.'· -., -,..-.. ·· ··  with  those of others.  Compromise  thus  is the  norm  and  the result may 
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Perception  III 
The  performance  of  any  economic  system can  be  gauged  partially 
by  how  well  the policy  institutions it invents serve  the goals of 
society  [4].  The  basic  tasks  any  economic  system must  perform are 
three: 
1.  allocation of  resources; 
2.  distribution of  incomes; 
3.  providing  for  economic  growth  and  development. 
Unfortunately,  the  policy  dilemma  begins  here.  If,  for  example, 
an  unfair distribution of  income  is perceived and an  institution is 
designed  to correct it,  the  chances  are  that the  changes  produced 
will  conflict with  one  of  the other  roles  of  the  economic  system. 
Specifically,  suppose  that society believes  farm  incomes  are  too  low. 
An  institution to  shore  up  farm  prices  is devised  to solve  the  prob-
lem.  However,  such  a  procedure  leads  to misallocation of  resources  by 
creating  nonmarket  incentives  to  produce  undesired  farm  products.  In 
fact,  it well  could  have  been  an overallocation of  resources  to  farm 
production  that led to  the  problem  in  the first place. 
Within  the context of  the  three major  tasks of  our  economic 
system,  how  has agriculture fared? 
1.  Allocation of  Resources.  In  recent history there have  been 
too many  resources  committed  to agriculture as evidenced  by  low  rates 
of  return .to agricultural assets.  This situation is due  in part to 
abundant  natural  resources and  continuous  productivity gains,  and  in 
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The  resource allocation  problem  also  is due,  in  no  small  measure,  to 
agricultural  policies  pursued  in this country  over  the past  50  years 
which  have  contributed  to  income  stability and  have  encouraged 
investment. 
2.  Distribution of  Income.  Farmers  and  farm  ~orkers per-
sistently have  fared worse  by  conventional  measures  of  economic well-
being  than  nonfarmers.  Per  capita  income  of  the  farm  population 
consistently  has  lagged  that of  the  non-farm  population  by  a  substan-
tial margin.  Although  farm  asset  values  have  increased  rapidly,  the 
.. 
returns  to  those assets  have  been  relatively  low. 
Within  the  farm  sector,  there also are  severe  income disparities. 
This arises  from  an  unequal  distribution of assets within  the sector, 
uneven  impacts  of  weather,  different enterprise mixes,  and  government 
programs.  Johnson  and  Short  {51  recently  have  shown  that most  of  the 
price and  income  benefits of  government  commodity  programs  for  farmers 
accrue  to  the larger  producers. 
3.  Economic  Growth  and  Development.  In contrast  to  the other 
tasks,  u.s.  agriculture  has  excelled and is the  envy  of  the world  in 
the areas of  growth  and  development.  The  tremendous  growth  is due,  in 
part,  to  the  innate advantages  of  the  U.S.  with  respect to soils and 
climate.  But,  to a  large degree,  it also  stems  from  public invest-
ments  in agricultural productivity and  historical agricultural 
programs.  The  institutions created and  funded  in the last half of  the 
-
19th century laid the foundation  for  goverment-sponsored productivity 
growth  (land grant universities,  U.S.D.A.,  government  credit and a 
""  .. --- . ' t· 
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government-financed  infrastructure).  Government  price and  income  poli-
cies and  the  entrepreneurial  structure of  management  also have  played 
their  roles.  Dr.  Sundquist  has  discussed  changes  in sector pro-
ductivities and  the  results of  the shift to a  hi-tech,  capital  inten-
sive agriculture. 
Perception  IV 
Policies  and  institutions change  more  slowly  than  the problems 
they  were  designed  to  address.  Policy machinery  often  is the  product 
of  years  of  experimentation and  political  compromise.  Such  has  been  .. 
the case  with  agricultural  policy.  Tradition,  politics,  power 
clusters,  sunk  costs,  existing  bureaucracies,  and  compromise  tend  to 
forestall major  changes  in  farm  qnd  food  policies  even  though  the 
existing  policies may  not  have  a  good  track  record.  Major  societal, 
economic,  or  political change  usually  is  required  to  stimulate policy 
change  [12].  One  has  only  to  observe  the  public  di~6atisfaction of 
the  late 1960s  and  the  change  in  policy  in  the early 1970s  or  the 
policy changes  subsequent  to  the 1973  export  boom  to validate this 
assertion. 
Perception V 
Policy  tends  to  be  reactionary  in  nature.  That is,  a  problem 
exists well  before policies and institutions are created to deal  ~itl( 
-_. 
it.  Further,  policies generally are addressed  to  symptoms  rather---tha--n 
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to. underlying problems.  The  policies directed  _  to the dairy industry]£.  _  - _ .~ 
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stand -as  a  glaring example of this point.  Programs were  designed  : to :~: . 
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shore  ··up  prices and protect  income  when  the evidence suggested that 
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too  many  resources  were  committed  to  the  production of  dairy  products. 
Seldom,  if  ever,  do  we  see  policies developed  to deal  with 
emerging  or anticipated problems.  An  exception  to  this rule may  be 
defense  policy.  Even  in defense,  differences  in perceptions  lead to 
continuous  debate  and  compromise. 
Perception  VI 
The  goals  for agriculture and agricultural  policy  change 
continually.  A long-run  goal  of  any  society  is  to  ensure  a  stable 
supply  of  reasonably  priced  food  and  fiber  to  its citizenry.  A  second 
and  related  goal  is  increased  productivity.  These  goals  likely will 
continue  to  rank  high,  but  even  the  productivity goal  is  coming  under 
attack.  Public  concern about  technological  advances  and  their 
application  is increasing.  Finally,  new  goals are  added  to  the list. 
These  include  export  expansion  and  food  as  an  international political 
tool. 
The  Early  Years  and  the  New  Deal  Years 
Prior  to  the precipitous  fall  in  farm  prices after World  War  I 
and  the  collapse of  many  national  economic  systems  and export markets, 
agricultural  policy  had  been directed almost  exclusively  to increasing 
productivity.  The  returns  to  government  investments  in  research  and 
development  were  minimal  before World  War  I.  The  domestic demand 
expansion  created  by  that war  and  increased  foreign  demand  led to high 
~~i .ces  .. that stimulated production and  technological  innovation. 
farm  income  doubled and exports tripled between 1910 and 1920. 
-'.  .:..  .  -
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Exports  accounted  for  30  percent of  cash  receipts  by  1920  (11). 
The  collapse of  those markets after World  War  I,  combined with 
sector overexpansion  and  increased capacity,  led to a  collapse of 
prices which  plunged agriculture into  the Great Depression. 
Farm  relief  became  the  rallying cry  of  the early 1920s.  George 
Peek  and General  Hugh  Johnson  led the struggle for agriculture 'and 
advocated  parity as  the  proper  price  standard  [1).  Secretary Wallace 
saw  the  problem  as  one  of  trade.  However,  it took a  l3-year gestation 
period  for  the concerns  to  generate  the  "New  Deal  legislation"  in  1933 
as  the Agricultural  Adjustment Act.  The  AAA  brought  a  new  era  of 
direct government  intervention  in agricultural markets  and  producer 
decision-making. 
The  AAA  required  a  shift in philosophy  from  one  of  expanding  pro-
duction  to  one  of  controlling it.  For  70  years  the  philosophy  and 
underlying  institutions  had  been  geared  to agricultural development. 
However,  this was  not  compatible with  the goals of  the  AAA  which  were 
"Relief,"  "Recovery,"  and  "Reform"  [8]. 
Part of  the  problem  was  a  disagreement  as  to  the  nature of  the 
problem.  One  school  of  thought maintained that the problem  resulted 
from  a  collapse of  the  system of  money  and credit.  The  remedy  would 
have ,been  to  change monetary  policy.  Another  school maintained that 
the problem was  an  overcapacity  in agriculture which  led to surplus 
j~.:;: - ;;;~ ':;';,P~odu.9 ,tfe.~ ~ ~ . , <  . 
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.;- ,~~~::,:~-: ,-.~.:,,:." ,:' _ Paarlberg  [8]  has  recently suggested that the inability of 
:  , ~- '~~ ::-" : ..;.::~  f~rmers  . and" poli  ticians to understand  the  complexities of  central !- -~~-: - . 
banking  was  the  primary  reason  that  the overcapacity  thesis was 
adopted and  the  AAA  became  law. 
Decisions  made  in  the 1930s  resulted in policy which  turned agri-
culture  inward.  Production controls and  price supports were  the 
primary  policy tools.  The  goal  was  to  improve  farm  income  and 
stabilize  farm  and  food  prices.  The  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  was 
viewed as  a  measure  for  "readjusting productive acreage  to market 
requirements,"  according  to  then  Secretary  of  Agriculture  Henry  A. 
Wallace  [10].  Despite Wallace's  contention  that  the  AAA  was  a 
"temporary  measure,"  it has  survived  for  50  years. 
While  the  AAA  and  succeeding  "farm bills" were  controlling pro-
duction and  supporting  prices,  research  and  education  simultaneously 
were  advancing  productivity  through  technological  innovation.  Thus 
opposing  forces  were at work.  Farm  programs  were  designed  to control 
the agricultural  plant  and  support  farm  prices  under  the assumption 
that a  temporary  excess  capacity existed,  while  Rand  D activities 
increased productivity and  added  to  capacity. 
Agricultural  productivity  has  increased at an  annual  rate of 
over  3  percent  per  year  since  the late 1930s.  Massive  internal ad-
justments were  required in agriculture to accommodate  technological 
advances  and  the accompanying  excess  capacity.  As  has  been  noted  by 
Dr.  Sundquist,  farms  have  become  fewer,  larger and more  specialized.- -
Farmers  increased output per unit of  land,  the government  controlled 
resource,  and  reduced per unit costs.  Capital  was  substituted for 
labor at a  rapid rate and often became  fixed in the specialized 
- ~-. - ~  .  -
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agricultural  activity  to  which  it was  committed.  Farms  became  larger 
to  justify  technological  innovation  and  increase  total  income.  The 
result was  increased  resource  concentration and  fewer  farms.  Capital 
intensification  further  aggravated  the excess  capacity and  resource 
fixity  problem  and  led  to  depressed prices and  low  returns.  Farm 
programs  designed  to  support  farm  prices and  bolster returns created a 
vicious  cycle.  To  meet  domestic goals,  farm  prices were  supported at 
levels  above  world  market  prices and,  for all practical purposes,  u.s. 
agricultural  products  were  priced out of  world  markets.  The  U.S. 
price  umbrella  also encouraged  expansion  of  production  in less 
efficient and/or  undedeveloped  regions. 
Until  the  early  1970s,  coping  with  excess  capacity  was  the major 
emphasis  of  U.s.  farm  policy.  After  a  brief  experiment  with  a  more 
market  oriented policy during  the  1970s,  higher  support  and  target 
prices  and  production  controls  have  been  resurrected~ 
The  reason  for  this  brief  review of  the circumstances  that led to 
the  AAA  is threefold:  (1)  the  economic  environment of agriculture in 
the 1920s  and  1930s was  not  unlike  the situation today;  (2)  with  minor 
modifications,  virtually every  farm  program  now  in effect originated 
in  the 1930s  (except  for  research,  education and  regulation).  and 
almost all of  the  programs  that began  in  the 1930s  are still in effect 
and  (3)  the prescriptions offered to  solve agricultural  problems  today 
are similar to  those offered in the 1930s  . ... .  . 
... ...  -...: 
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NEW  ERA  FOR  AGRICULTURE? 
Some  feel  that  the events of  the  1970s  signaled a  new  era  of 
periodic surpluses and  deficits  for  u.S.  agriculture  [6].  Others 
claim that  the  the  1970s  were  simply  an  interruption  in  the  long-
term  trend of  chronic excess  farm  capacity.  Which  is correct? 
Arguments  can  be  made  on  both  sides.  However,  the  policy  chosen  would 
be quite different depending  on  the  scenario accepted  by  the 
developers  of  farm  legisl~tion. 
The  events  of  the 1970s  were  the  result of  world  crop  failures, 
new  trade policies,  changes  in  international  exchange  rates and  in 
domestic agricultural  policies.  The  results of  these  changes  were 
quite drastic and  have  been  well  documented.  Agriculture  turned out-
ward.  Within  a  few  years  the market  for  agricultural  products  lost 
, 
its primary  dependence  on  a  domestic  market  protected  by  high  price 
supports,  acreage  controls and  government  held  stocks,  and  became  a 
Inarket  characterized by  heavy  international  participation and  in-
creased instability. 
As  in  the 1920s,  exports accounted for  about one-third of  the 
market  for agricultural  commodities  in  the mid-1970s.  u.S.  farm  income 
doubled within  three  years  and  the potential  for  rising real  farm 
prices  seemed  greater than  ever· before.  The  results stimulated farm 
_ . c' ··.·cons.olidation,  increased production and capitalization in the sector. 
.-.  '- .. 
.  :~-. ·During  the ··1970s total output  expanded  by  30  percent,  output per unit 
of···labor . almost  doubled,  and  output  per acre  increased  by  about  30 - . 
-.I ;.  .. 
percent.  Expanded  output  and  increased  productivity were  closely  tied 
to  an  increased  dependence  on  nonfarm  inputs  and  borrowed capital. 
Inflation and  the  energy  crisis continued  to  raise  the prices of  those 
inputs  to  which  the  sector  found  itself addicted.  The  links  between 
agriculture,  the general  economy  and  economic  policy  became critical 
and  the  results  threatened  the survival  of  the  farming  sector.  This 
came  as  a  surprise to  many  threatened  farmers  and  agribusinessmen and 
to  some  policy  makers. 
For  the first time  in  over  40  years,  farmers  were  getting their 
signals  from  the market  rather  than  government  farm  programs.  Policy 
makers  welcomed  the decreased  government  involvement  and  the  improved 
publicity for  government  and  agriculture.  Target  and  support prices 
were  used  to protect against  downside  risk.  Price  and  income  problems 
that recurred during  the  decade  were  viewed as  aberations,  not as  a 
long-term  trend.  Stopgap measures  were  used  to  shore  up  the sector  in 
the  face  of  these  "temporary  problems." 
Droughts  exacerbated the situation  by  the  beginning  of  the 1980s 
and  producers  and  policy makers  began  to doubt  that the  "new  era"  was 
anything different.  Increasing production costs,  declining  farm  in-
come,  unfavorable weather and  unstable export markets  comb~ .n~9 to 
produce  a  situation in agriculture of crisis proportions.  Farmers 
/ ..  !>_~:~ _.:: .... petitioned their old friend,  "The Government,  II  for  help.  Policy 
'. _..  .  makers  responded with  a  resurrection of  the policy tools used  in the 
. u · ~ lr .·J,.·~:-· . ;".  t.~_~'::'; 
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The  PIK  (Payment  in  Kind)  program  was  initiated to  provide  a  stop-
gap mechanism  to deal  with  a  situation characterized  by  weak  demand 
and  ballooning  stocks.  PIK  was  viewed as  a  mechanism  for  thwarting 
the auctioneer  on  some  farms  and  for  dealing with  the current surplus 
problem.  PIK  was  intended as  a  method  for  dealing with  an  emergency 
and  was  not  designed  to deal  with  long-run  industry  problems.  Does 
this  sound  familiar?  Some  of  the  same  concerns  undergirded  th'e 
Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933. 
Agriculture  and  food  policy  in  the  1980s  can  best  be  described as 
.. 
crisis intervention.  Government  costs  for  the  PIK  program almost 
\ 
matched  net  income  to agriculture  in  1983.  While  there  is little 
doubt  that  the  PIK  program  benefited  farm  income,  bad  publicity  and 
political costs  may  well  outweigh  the  benefits as  the  time  approaches 
for  developing  the  1985  legislation. 
Production Capacity and  Markets 
Recent  studies  have  indicated that the global  balance  between 
cereal  production and  population will  remain  tenuous  for  several 
years,  indicating local vulnerability  to annual  shortfalls  from 
weather  vagaries,  wars,  or mistakes  in policy  [9].  Competition  in 
international markets will  intensify among  major exporters.  Yet, 
exports  from  North  America  are expected  to double  by  the year  2000 
[7].  Such  projections raise major questions about  u.  S.  agricultural 
~~p~city.  Studies  by  Economic Perspectives,  Inc.  suggest a  1.8 'per-
- ::  "- :-:~-=:.:. --- . 
' -- ~.- ·cent:· annual  increase in production during  the-rest of  this century 
."  .. -- .. - i~ -
with  most  of  the  increase  coming  from  new  technology-induced yield 
increases. 
Land  and water  issues will  intensify as agricultural production 
and  technological  development  continue.  To  a  large extent,  however, 
technological  change will  determine  future  supply-demand  balances and 
the  pressure  on  land and  water  resources.  A major  breakthrough  in 
yield increasing  technology  could significantly alter supply-demand 
projections.  Although  predicting  the direction of  technological 
development  is hazardous at best,  most  scientists  indicate that  future 
development  will  be  concentrated  in  biological/physical areas  which 
are output  increasing  but  size neutral. 
Stability,  or  its absence,  is another  issue  relating  to  capacity. 
Past agricultural  policies  promoted  stability which  permitted  longer 
planning  horizons  and  promoted  investment.  The  result was  increased 
capacity.  Expansion  in  foreign markets,  inflation,  dependence  on 
off-farm inputs,  and  high  capitalization O rates  have  destabilized  farm 
product  and  input markets.  Farm  programs  have  not offset these 
destabilizing influences.  Instability can  create  inefficiencies  in 
private  investment  decisions.  There  is a  real question as  to which 
costs are greater -- the private costs of  poor decisions  under 
instability or  the public costs of maintaining an  "acceptable
n  level 
of  stability?  Experience  has  taught  us  that too  much  stability can 
lead to an  over-commitment of  resources  and  excess  capacity.  More 
research  is needed to better assess  the public and  private costs of 
instability. ··l:i·· 
Structural  Changes 
Modern  U.S.  agriculture  is a  product of  more  than  a  century of 
technological  revolution,  internal  adjustments  and  institutional 
changes.  Production agriculture is a  declining  industry  in the  pure 
sense,  i.e.,  consumers  spend  a  declining share  of  their  income  on 
food.  However,  broadly defined,  the  food  production,  processing and 
distribution system  is a  large and  growing  industry. 
Recent  studies  reveal  that less  than  5  percent  of  U.S.  farms 
account  for  over  50  perce~t of  total  cash  receipts  and  87  percent of 
net  farm  income.  Twelve  percent of  U.S.  farms  account  for  almost  70 
percent  of  cash  receipts  and  nearly all net  farm  income.  The  two 
smallest  sales  classes  accounted  for  72  percent of  farms  but  less  than 
13  percent  of  total cash  farm  receipts  and  had  negative  net  farm 
incomes  in  1981.  Net  farm  income  is much  more  volatile  for  the  largest 
5  percent  of  farms  than  for  the  smaller  72  percent.  The  bimodal 
distribution of  farms  contains  a  significant message  for  policy 
makers.  The  problems  of  the  two  groups  are different and  require 
different policies. 
New  Forces Affecting Agriculture 
It has  been argued almost  since the enactment of  the  AAA  50  years 
ago  that national  and  international politics and policies,  weather, 
wars,  and monetary  policy all  have more  profound  impacts  on 
agriculture than domestic  farm  programs.  Recent  experience with  high 
interest rates,  escalating input prices,  fluctuating exchange  rates, \ 
~  .  , 
.  , 
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embargoes,  trade  policy  and  tax  policy  gives  credence  to  this 
argument.  Each  class  of  events  has  had  significant  impacts  on 
agriculture.  Yet,  in a  recent article Rasmussen  (10]  argued  that the 
situation in agriculture  improved little following  enactment of  the 
AAA  until  the  outbreak  of  World  War  II  . 
It recently  has  been  argued  that the  influence of  exchange  rates 
on  exports  and of  monetary  policy  on  price/cost stability is more 
important  to  the  health  of  agriculture  than agricultural  policy  per  se 
[13].  In  fact,  Schuh  [13]  contended  that the major  problem  facing 
~ 
agriculture  is  that commodity  programs  operate counter  to  the  best 
interest of  both  agriculture  and  the  nation.  He  maintained that 
commodity  programs  were  designed  to  operate  in an  economic  system  that 
was  significantly different  from  the  current  system.  The  Schuh  argu-
ment  hinges  on  the  fact  that current agricultural  policy  fails  to  take 
account  of  changes  in  the  u.S.  economy,  the  internat;onal  economy,  and 
in  the  way  the u.S.  economy  relates  to  the rest of  the world.  Schuh 
also argued  that  the assumption of  a  highly  inelastic aggregate  demand 
for  agricultural commodities  no  longer  holds,  particularly for major 
export  commodities.  A recent analysis  by  Tweeten  [14]  supports  the 
Schuh  position.  If the  demand  for agricultural commodities  is 
elastic,  Schuh's  argument  holds  and agricultural  policies which  sup-
port prices and restrict production  reduce,  rather than  increase,  farm 
income.  This may  have  been  the situation during much  of  the past  SO 
years  although  the lack of  reliable data  precludes a  definitive 
analysis. - 1/-
Other  "new"  forces  affecting agriculture and agricultural  policy 
include:  changing  goals  for  the agricultural sector,  resource  use  and 
environmental  concerns,  international  trade and  the  U.S.  balance of 
payments,  food  diplomacy,  and last but  not least,  the diminishing 
political clout of agriculture  in  the halls of Congress.  New  entrants 
into  the agricultural  policy arena  have  brought  new  ideas  and 
political clout  to  influence  the  "not  so  invisible hand"  that guided 
the agricultural  sector. 
While still among  the,goals,  income  and price supports,  income 
stability and  equitable  resource  returns  for  agriculture  no  longer 
enjoy  "north-star" status as  guides  for  agricultural  policy  and 
industry  performance.  Urban  society and its political  representatives 
are  disavowing  the agrarian  philosophy.  There  is less  concern  than 
formerly  with  the agrarian life-style or  the  "family  farm  concept"  and 
, 
more  emphasis  on  a  reasonably  priced and  reliable food  supply.  That 
some  farmers  are  going  bankrupt and  that  the  industry must  go  through 
wrenching  adjustments likely will  be  viewed as  normal  adjustments  to 
changing  economic conditions.  Tradeoffs will  be  required  to enact  any 
agricultural policy. 
New  problems  facing  the agricultural sector will  include:  a 
dependence  on world markets;  competition  for  natural,  nonrenewable 
resources;  environmental  tradeoffs;  increased sensitivity to macro-
economic linkages;  increased uncertainty;  and in general,  a  greater 
dependence  upon  the performance of  and conditions and policies affect-
ing other sectors. , ', 
Summary:  What  Have  We  Learned? 
By  way  of  a  summary,  I  will list some  of  the  lessons  ~uestions) 
embedded  in  the  preceding discussion. 
Policy  formulated  in the u.s.  to address  farm  problems  has  been 
and still is plagued  by:  (1)  an  assumption  that  the, problems  were 
transitory  and  (2)  by  a  tendency  to  formulate  policy  and  programs  to 
short-run  problems  [2,  3).  The  result  has  been  50  years  of  farm  and 
food  policy designed  to  solve  temporary  problems  or  short-run  "emer-
gencies."  Yet,  the  problems  continue.  Whether  past  farm  policy 
receives  a  passing or  a  failing  grade,  the  important question  is 
whether  we  have  learned  the  lessons  provided  through  50  years  of 
sector  intervention.  While  the  problems  may  change  and  become  more 
complex  and  the  goals  for  the  sector may  change,  experience  has  been  a 
useful  tutor,  if we  learn  the  lessons offered. 
Lesson  I.  When  agricultural  policy  is  implemented,  it reflects 
the  current  technological,  political,  and  economic  climate.  Con-
versely,  new  policy  initiatives take  a  long  time to enact and 
implement.  However,  conditions  change  more  quickly  now  than  they 
formerly  did.  The  question  that remains  is whether it is possible to 
devise  a  long-range agricultural policy with  sufficient flexibility to 
'i .  .  ;  . 
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Lesson  III.  Agricultural  policy  has  focused at least as  much 
on  symptoms  as  on  underlying  problems.  The  debates  over dairy  policy 
serve  to  illustrate.  Relief  from  unfavorable  economic  conditions 
rather  than  reform  becomes  the  perpetual  rallying cry  [4]. 
Lesson  IV.  Agricultural  programs  directed toward  perceived 
problems  often have  far-reaching  and  contradictory  impacts.  The 
structure and  capacity effects of  price  and  income  supports and  the 
development  of  farm  productivity  through  research  and  education 
illustrate the dilemma. 
Lesson  V.  Vested  interest groups  are  responsible  for  the 
creation of  policy.  But  agricultural  policy,  once  implemented, 
creates  new  vested interest groups  that  seek  to maintain  programs  even 
after  the  need  for  them  has  expired.  For  example,  current policy  is 
an  accumulation  of  commodity  programs  designed  to  pr~tect and  support 
market  positions  of  vested  interests rather  than  to  promote  sector 
adjustment.  Such  programs  promote  inefficient resource allocation 
among  commodities  and  regions. 
Lesson  VI.  The  bimodal  size and  income distribution of  farms 
suggests  that different  resource situations lead to different prob-
lems.  A single program cannot address  the problems  of  diverse groups. 
Lesson VII.  Operators of  large farms  have  been  the primary 
beneficiaries of  past price. support and  income  enhancement  programs 
.. .  '.-
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Lesson  VIII.  Export  expansion  is  not  and  is  not  likely to 
become  a  panacea  for  solving  the  "farm  problem."  Recent  experiences 
have  taught  many  lessons  about  export markets,  currency  exchange 
rates,  trade  policy,  embargoes,  and  the like. 
Lesson  IX.  The  U.S.  agriculture sector  is highly  interrelated 
with  other  sectors of  the  national  economy  and with  the  international 
economy.  Changes  in  national  and  international  policy  or  conditions 
have  far  reaching  impacts  on agriculture.  These  impacts  often are  far 
greater  than  those  of  domestic agricultural  policy. 
Lesson  X.  Sound analysis of  conditions  and  interrelationships 
is mandatory  to  avoid  serious mistakes  in  policy.  Concerns  expressed 
about  monetary  policies  prior  to  enactment  of  AAA  and  recent  evidence 
on  the  price elasticity of  demand  for  agricultural  products  illustrate 
the  point. 
Lesson  XI.  Market  intervention  comes  at a  cost ~  Often  both 
public and  private costs  are  involved.  One  of  the most  critical ques-
tions  to  be  addressed  in  formulating  food  and agricultural policy is 
"who  bears  the  cost?"  In  the absence  of  an  equitable distribution of 
costs,  either the policy will  be  in  jeopardy,  or  the agricultural 
sector will  be  required to make  unacceptable adjustments. 
Lesson  XII.  Finally,  within the spectrum of available policy 
alternatives,  given  a  democratic society and  a  modified free enter-
prise system,  the number  actually tried has  been small.  Most ·wneww 
proposals are simply  rehashes  of  what  has  been  tried before,  without -21-
proper assessment  of  the  consequences  of  the earlier experience  (4). 
PIK  is an  example  in  point. 
Serious mistakes  in policy,  whether  due  to  poor analysis of alter-
natives  and  their consequences or  to  the  undue  influence of  vested 
interests,  could seriously  impede  attainment of  long-run objectives 
and  create severe  internal  adjustment  problems -- problems  that could 
jeopardize  the stability and  viability of  the agricultural sector 
[11]. 
Attempts  to address  current  farm  problems  with  the policy  tools 
of  the  past could well  be~doomed to  failure  [12].  Agriculture has 
changed,  markets  have  changed,  interdependencies  have  changed.  Poli-
cies and  programs  also must  be  changed!! 
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